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COMMENTS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-"REVIEW OF WHOLE
RECORD" IN DETERMINING SUBSTANTIALITY
OF EVIDENCE TO SUSTAIN ADMINISTRATIVE
BOARD'S FINDING
The scope of review of a National Labor Relations Board order by
a United States Court of Appeals has long been limited by the so-called
"substantial evidence" rule.- The formulation of this rule grew out of
the judicial interpretations of that section of the National Labor
Relations Act2 (hereafter referred to as the Wagner Act) which pro-
vided: "the findings of the Board as to the facts, if supported by
evidence, shall be conclusive."3 "Evidence" was held to mean "sub-
stantial evidence," and it was said that "substantial evidence is more
than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. '" 4 It has also
been said that:
"Substantial evidence . . . must do more than create a
suspicion of the existence of the fact to be established. It must
be enough to justify, if the trial were to a jury, a refusal to
direct a verdict when the conclusion sought to be drawn from it
is one of fact for the jury."'
The scope of review of administrative findings, under statutes such
as above quoted, and of jury verdicts is therefore the same. This
precludes the courts from weighing the evidence in reviewing board
orders, and leaves the courts with only the duty of searching the
record for substantial evidence on which the board's order was based.6
However, in applying the "substantial evidence" rule some courts,
either in fact or by implication arising from the language used in the
opinions, appeared to merely look into the record to find substantial
evidence to justify the board's finding. The decisions in most instances,
did not show and in fact negatived a showing, that the court examined
the whole record in coming to the conclusion that there was substantial
evidence. As shown by the Court's discussion in Universal Camera
Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board,' the Congress, in amending
I Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 305 U.S. 191,
59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126, (1938).2 NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS AcT (1935), 49 Stat. 449, 29 U.S.C. 151, 29
U.S.C.A. 151.3Supra, Note 2, section 10(e).
4National Labor Relations Board v. Nevada Consolidated Copper Corp., 316
U.S. 105, 62 S.Ct. 960, 86 L.Ed. 1305 (1942).
5 Supra, Note 4.
6 National Labor Relations Board v. Columbian Enameling and Stamping Co.,
306 U.S. 292, 59 S.Ct. 501, 83 L.Ed. 660 (1939).
7Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 71 S.Ct. 456(1951).
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the Wagner Acts (hereafter referred to as the Taft-Hartley Act) and
in enacting the Federal Administrative Procedure Act,9 sought to retain
the substantial evidence rule but at the same time to do away with the
practice of not examining the whole record in determining whether
there was substantial evidence. The Taft-Hartley Act provides: "The
findings of the Board with respect to questions of fact if supported by
substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole shall be con-
clusive,"'1 and the Federal Administrative Procedure Act provides that
the court shall "(B) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings
and conclusions found to be; (5) unsupported by substantial evidence
... In making the foregoing determinations the court shall review the
whole record or such portions thereof as may be cited by any party.""
It was held in the Universal Camera case 2 that the standard of review
specifically required of the Labor Board by the Taft-Hartley Act is the
same as that to be exacted by the courts reviewing every administrative
action subject to the Administrative Procedure Act.
This command of the statutes to review the entire record does not
mean that the court can now weigh the evidence but it does mean that
the court in considering the substantiality of the evidence "must take
into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight.' 13
Thus the court still will not weigh the evidence in support of the
board's finding as against that which does not support the finding, but
will consider the whole record, and consider contrary evidence in re-
lation to its persuasiveness in determining the substantiality of the
evidence in support of the board's finding. Said the court in the
Universal Camera case :'4
"Congress has merely made it clear that a reviewing court is
not barred from setting aside a Board decision when it cannot
conscientiously find that evidence supporting that decision is
substantial, when viewed in the light that the record in its entirety
furnishes, including the body of evidence opposed to the Board's
view."
In that case'5 the labor board had reversed the findings of the trial
examiner, and the court of appeals had said that the reasons for reversal
"do not seem to us enough to overbear the evidence, which the record
did not preserve and which may have convinced the examiner . . .
However we think that we are altogether to disregard this as a factor
S National Labor Relations Act (1935), supra, note 2, as amended by Labor
Management Relations Act (1947), 61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C. 151, 29 U.S.C.A.
151.
9 AI INISTRATIvE PROCEDURE Acr (1946), 60 Stat. 237, 5 U.S.C.A. 1001.
10 Supra, Note 8, section 10(e).
11Supra, Note 9, section 10(e).
12 Supra, Note 7.
13 Supra, Note 7.
14 Supra, Note 7.
isSupra, Note 7.
[Vol. 35
COMMENTS
in our review, which we should confine to the bare record."' 6 On appeal,
the Supreme Court remanded the case to the court of appeals. "On
reconsideration of the record it should accord the findings of the trial
examiner the relevance that they reasonably command in answering the
comprehensive question whether the evidence supporting the Board's
order is substantial."'1 This does not mean that whenever the examiner
and the board do not agree the evidence may not be substantial, but it
does mean that the reasons for such disagreement may affect the sub-
stantiality of the evidence. Thus the court must now review the whole
record and consider the effect any opposing evidence may have upon
the substantiality of the evidence in support of the board's finding.
It is expected that such a review will prevent such decisions as
Nevada Consolidated Copper Co. v. N.L.R.B.' s where the court of
appeals'9 found that upon considering credibility of witnesses and con-
flicting evidence the board's order was not based on substantial evidence;
reversing on appeal,20 the Supreme Court said that if the board's order
was based on substantial evidence it was conclusive; N.L.R.B. v.
Columbia Products Corp.,21 where the court said "our only duty is to see
whether there was any substantial evidence to support the finding";
Consolidated Edison Corp. v. N.L.R.B.,22 where the court said the record
was not wholly barren of evidence to support the board's finding and
therefore the order must stand; and Wilson and Co. v. N.L.R.B.,2
where the court said that it had sifted the evidence for the sole purpose
of ascertaining the existence of substantial evidence to support the
board's finding and added: "We have recognized (or tried to) that the
findings must be sustained, even when they are contrary to the great
weight of the evidence, and we have ignored, or at least tried to ignore,
the shocking injustices which such findings, opposed to the overwhelm-
ing weight of the evidence, produce."
Wisconsin's Administrative Procedure Act is similar to the Federal
Acts24 in that it provides that the court may reverse or modify the
decision of an agency if "unsupported by substantial evidence in view of
'S National Labor Relations Board v. Uni-;ersal Camera Corp., 179 F. (2d) 749
(2 Cir., 1950).
1'Supra, Note 7.
's Supra, Note 4.
19Nevada Consolidated Copper Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 122
F. (2d) 587 (10th Cir., 1941).20Supra, Note 4.
21 National Labor Relations Board v. Columbia Products Corp., 141 F. (2d) 687
(2d Cir., 1944). The court went on to say: "Though it may strain our
credulity, if it does not quite break it down, we must accept it, and in the
case at bar, regardless of what might have been our own conclusion, we are
not prepared to say that no rational person could have come to the same
conclusion."22 Supra, Note 1.
"Supra, Note 6.24Supra, Notes 10 and 11.
1952]
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the entire record as submitted."' ' In two early Wisconsin cases26 the
court held that it did not have jurisdiction to determine the factual issues
nor weigh the evidence, but could only look to see if there was sub-
stantial evidence upon which the findings were based. In interpreting the
tision of the Wisconsin Administrative Procedure Act as above
quoted, the court in the Gateway case 27 said that "substantial evidence"
means "any evidence." In that case quotations from the Consolidated
Edison cases appear at great length as to the meaning of substantial
evidence, but the case does not seem to consider or construe the meaning
of "in view of the entire record." It seems that when this provision29
again comes before the court this language should be given consider-
ation, and the interpretation of the provision of the Wisconsin Adminis-
trative Procedure Act should be brought in accord with the interpre-
tation of similar provisions in the Federal Acts.30
Louis R. GILBERT
2- Wis. STATS. (1949), Sec. 227.20 (1) (d).2 6 Milwaukee v. Stratford, 245 Wis. 505, 15 N.W. (2d) 812, (1944) ; Ray-O-Vac
v. W. E. R. B., 249 Wis. 112, 23 N.W. (2d), 1948.
27 Gateway City Transfer Co. v. Public Service Commission, 253 Wis. 397,
34 N.W. (2d) 238 (1948).
2 Supra, Note 1.29 Supra, Note 25.30Supra, Notes 8 and 9.
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